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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
LEROY RAYMOND JACKSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890546-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Leroy Raymond Jackson relies on his 
opening brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the 
statements of jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts. 
Appellant responds to the State's answer to his opening brief as 
follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A circumstance indicative of a "seizure" includes the 
aggressive manner in which Officer Hurst blocked Appellant Jackson's 
car. Officer Hurst testified to another factor supportive of a 
seizure when he indicated that Jackson was the target of his 
investigation. The court clearly erred in misinterpreting the facts 
and the reasoning of the cases cited by Appellant Jackson, 
particularly the decision of United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384 
(9th Cir. 1989) . Finally, the officer's conduct cannot be justified 
by the fruits of the illegal seizure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT BELIEVED THAT HE WAS NOT FREE TO LEAVE. 
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
A. A SEIZURE OCCURRED WHEN THE OFFICER BLOCKED 
APPELLANT'S CAR. 
In its brief, the State cited United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544 (1980), for the well-recognized standard applicable to 
the case at bar: 
A "seizure" under the fourth amendment occurs when a 
reasonable person in view of all the circumstances 
surrounding the incident believes he or she is not 
free to leave. United States v. Mendenhall. 446 
U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Example[s) of circumstances 
indicating a seizure are as follows: (1) the 
threatening presence of several officers, (2) the 
display of a weapon by an officer, (3) some physical 
touching of the citizen, or (4) the use of language 
or tone of a voice indicating that compliance with 
the officer's request might be compelled. 
Mendenhall. 446 U.S. at 554. 
Appellee's Brief at 6. Appellant Jackson agrees with the Mendenhall 
standard, Appellant's Brief at 19, but notes that "the test is 
flexible," Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 100 L.Ed.2d 565, 
573, 108 S.Ct. 1975 (1988), and encompasses other circumstances 
indicative of a seizure: 
[5] The police activated a siren or flasher; [6] 
they commanded respondent to halt, or displayed any 
weapons; or [7] thev operated the car in a 
aggressive manner to block respondent's course or 
otherwise control the direction or speed of his 
movement. 
100 L.Ed.2d at 573 (emphasis added). 
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In the instant action, Officer Hurst operated his car in an 
aggressive manner by blocking Jackson's car and his access out of 
the parking lot.1 See Appellant's brief, Point I. Officer Hurst 
had just "followed" [Jackson's] car into the parking lot," (MS 17), 
despite the fact that Jackson had not committed a traffic 
violation. (T 7, 27). Hovering close by, Officer Hurst watched 
Jackson maneuver into a parking stall. (MS 17-18). During 
Jackson's maneuvering, he faced each and every point of the compass, 
(MS 17, 18, 23); (T 7-8), and observed Officer Hurst's marked patrol 
car. 
Jackson then watched Officer Hurst drive his patrol car 
directly in front2 of him. Officer Hurst was admittedly moving into 
position from a nearby location just before Jackson had stopped his 
car. (T 9). According to Hurst, "[a]s soon as [Jackson] exited [his 
car], I stopped my car." (T 9). Not only was Hurst quickly upon 
Jackson, blocking his car by simply stopping the patrol car, Hurst 
also made clear what his intentions were by stopping less than one 
car length in front of Jackson's car. (T 52). The trial court 
1
 Appellant Jackson reemphasizes that the seizure occurred 
initially when Officer Hurst blocked Jackson's car. Appellant's 
brief at 17-18. Even if Jackson's person may have, in fact, been 
free to walk away, the initial seizure of Jackson's car cannot be 
ignored. Restraining Jackson's movement by blocking his car is akin 
to falsely imprisoning an individual by retaining control over his 
or her property, (e.g. a wallet or a purse) 
2
 When referring to the location of the cars, Appellant's 
brief uses the term "directly in front" in conformity with Officer 
Hurst's reference to the front of Jackson's car which faced south. 
(T 8) (Jackson's car "pulled straight back into another stall in the 
north side of the parking lot"). 
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discredited Hurst's testimony that Jackson had enough room to 
maneuver past the parked patrol car. (T 52). 
Officer Hurst could have parked on either side of Jackson's 
car, (T 16-17), but chose instead to block Appellant's car. A fence 
blocked Jackson's exit to the north, (MS 23), Officer Hurst's patrol 
car blocked the exit to the south, (T 51), and, unless Jackson 
walked completely around the parked patrol car, his exit to the east 
was blocked as well. As recognized by the trial court, "[t]he 
police officer upon stopping [his patrol car], however, did block 
[Jackson's] automobile, and for me [the Court] to find otherwise, 
frankly, would be intellectually dishonest." (T 51). 
Officer Hurst's conduct thus constituted a seizure as he 
"operated the car in an aggressive manner to block [Jackson's] 
course or otherwise control the direction or speed of his movement." 
Michigan v. Chesternut. 100 L.Ed.2d at 573; cf. United States v. 
Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1987) (when an officer blocked a 
one-lane driveway, the defendant's freedom to leave was eliminated 
and the trial "courts's suggestion that [the defendant] could have 
backed around the [officer's] car or ignored [the officer] defies 
common sense"). Moreover, had Jackson attempted to walk west, Hurst 
"would have demanded a driver's license." (T 27). Appellant 
Jackson could not have moved freely in any direction. 
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B. IF APPELLANT STOPPED AND EXITED HIS CAR IN 
RESPONSE TO OFFICER HURST'S APPEARANCE AND 
CONDUCT, THE ENCOUNTER CANNOT BE DEEMED 
VOLUNTARY. 
The State attempted to justify the trial court's ruling by 
stressing that, "[g]iyen Judge Murphy's finding of fact3 that 
defendant voluntarily initiated the encounter as a pedestrian, 
defendant fails to come forward with any factually similar case law 
which [concludes that a seizure occurred through the application of] 
[F]ourth [A]mendment legal standards." Appellee's brief at 13. Not 
only does the State ignore United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384 (9th 
Cir. 1987), it also discounts the reasoning underlying each cited 
opinion. See Appellee's brief at 13 n.6; Appellant's Reply brief n. 
For example, in Kerr, defendant Kerr "was approximately 
forty to fifty feet from the patrol car [when he] left his own car 
and met Deputy Hedrick on foot." 817 F.2d at 1385. Deputy Hedrick 
3
 When an appellate court reviews the findings of a bench 
trial, the findings are rejected if they are "clearly erroneous." 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). The clearly erroneous 
standard differs from the "sufficiently inconclusive" or 
"insubstantial" jury verdict standard because in the former, the 
appellate court does not simply view the evidence "most favorable to 
the appellee" or resolve all conflicts and inferences "in his 
favor." Compare Walker, 743 P.2d at 192-93, with State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). Rather, 
[if] the trial court's verdict in a criminal case 
[is] against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made, 
the . . . verdict will be set aside. 
Walker, 743 P.2d at 193. 
had just made a U-turn and entered a driveway to block Kerr's 
passageway. The Ninth Circuit held that, even though defendant Kerr 
had "initiated" the encounter by approaching the Deputy first, "Kerr 
stopped and exited his car primarily in response to Deputy Hedrick's 
official appearance and conduct, rather than of his own volition." 
Id. at 1386. "Deputy Hedrick's conduct thus precipitated the 
confrontation with Kerr." Id. at 1387. 
In the present case, Officer had also just made a U-turn 
and entered the driveway of a parking lot. (T 7); (MS 17). Yet, 
Officer Hurst, unlike Deputy Hedrick, made sure that his "suspect" 
could not leave when he moved his patrol car directly in front of 
Jackson's car. Compare (T 9, 52) with Kerr. 817 F.2d at 1387. The 
State has not distinguished the facts or reasoning of Kerr, nor has 
it rebutted the fact that Jackson was the target of Officer Hurst's 
investigation. See Appellant's brief at 18 and Point II; Kerr, 817 
F.2d at 1387 (Kerr could have "reasonably perceived that he was the 
target of Deputy Hedrick's investigation and thus was not free to 
leave"). 
According to Officer Hurst, he testified that he had two 
purposes in following the vehicle: "to know any possible suspect's 
name" (Jackson was the only individual in the car) and "to find out 
who the car belonged to." (T 20-21). His testimony confirmed the 
nature of his "investigation": 
Q. [By counsel] And you wanted to know any 
possible suspect's name if you could learn it? 
A. [By Hurst] Yes 
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Q. You didn't have any other facts about the 
robbery at that time? 
A. No. 
Q. You weren't going to be able to proceed 
investigating that, really, were you? 
A. It all depended on what I found, 
Q. Excuse me. 
A. It all depended on what I found. 
Q. What were you looking for that would have 
assisted you? 
A. I don't know. Identification, initially. 
Q. How would that have helped you? 
A. To find out who he was. 
Q. Now, knowing who he was, was there anything 
else further that you could do at that time to 
investigate the Postal Shop robbery? 
A. As soon as I found out who he was, that was 
about it. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I wanted to find out who the car belonged to, 
also. 
(T 21) (emphasis added) (Addendum A). Appellant Jackson was 
unquestionably the target of Officer Hurst's "fishing expedition." 
Despite the trial court' ruling that "there [was] no articulable 
suspicion to stop the defendant [Jackson] prior to the time that the 
officer indicated the he had placed the defendant under arrest," 
(T 51), the court clearly erred in its decision to disregard the 
- 7 -
precipitating questioning and conduct4 by Officer Hurst and allow, 
over Appellant's objections, the evidence ultimately found on 
Jackson's person. (R 33); (T 51-53). 
4
 With its emphasis on Appellant Jackson's "initiation" of 
the encounter, the State is essentially arguing "that the Fourth 
Amendment is never implicated until an individual stops in response 
to the police's show of authority." Michigan v. Chesternut, 100 
L.Ed.2d at 571. The U.S. Supreme Court has previously rejected this 
argument because "petitioner [the State] would have us rule that a 
lack of objective and particularized suspicion would not poison 
police conduct, no matter how coercive, as long as the police did 
not succeed in actually apprehending the individual." Id. 
In Chesternut, respondent Michael Chesternut turned to run 
in the opposite direction of an approaching police car. The car 
"quickly caught up with respondent and drove alongside him for a 
short distance. As [the car] drove beside him the officers observed 
respondent discard a number of packets. Id. at 569. After 
inspecting the packets, an officer discovered that they contained 
pills and surmised that the pills contained codeine. The officers 
arrested Chesternut for the possession of narcotics. Id. 
While the principles of Chesternut are helpful, some 
differences should be noted. The Chesternut Court held that "the 
police conduct involved here would not have communicated to the 
reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon 
respondent's freedom of movement." 100 L.Ed.2d at 573. 
Nevertheless, unlike the police conduct in Chesternut, Officer 
Hurst's conduct in the instant action clearly communicated his 
intent to restrain Appellant Jackson's freedom of movement. Jackson 
could not move his car at all and his individual movement was 
unreasonably confined to one point of the compass. Appellant 
Jackson does not contend that officers are never able to pursue 
unarticularized hunches, see Appellant's brief, Point III, but 
submits that under the existing circumstances, Officer Hurst's 
conduct, unlike the officers in Chesternut, satisfied the 
aforementioned example indicative of a seizure: aggressively 
blocking Appellant Jackson's car. 100 L.Ed.2d at 573. 
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POINT II 
THE OFFICER'S CONDUCT CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED IN HINDSIGHT 
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief) 
The State contends that "Judge Murphy specifically found 
that Hurst's request for identification was reasonable," Appellee's 
brief at 16, but fails to add the court's reasoning: "upon 
defendent's statement that he had no driver's license, a reasonable 
suspicion arose that ^ crime or infraction had been committed, that 
is, driving without a license, and the defendant had committed that 
crime or infraction." (T 52). "That reasoning, however, 
'justify[ing] the arrest by the search and at the same time . . . 
the search by the arrest,' just 'will not do.'" Smith v. Ohio, 494 
U.S. , 108 L.Ed.2d 464, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 1289 (1990). In a 
per curiam opinion, the Smith Court ruled that a search is not 
justified when its legality is based solely upon the evidence seized 
during the search. Id. Police cannot maintain the circular 
argument, the Court held, that the search was properly incident to 
an arrest that could be justified only by the fruits of the search. 
Id. The Smith reasoning should apply with equal force to Appellant 
Jackson's case. 
- 9 -
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Jackson respectfully 
requests that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded to 
the trial court for a new trial or dismissal. 
SUBMITTED this ^X( day of June, 1990. 
KAREN STAM 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
£ 
RONkLD S ,v FUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 3-\ day of June, 1990. 
RONALD S> FUJINO 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q And you wanted to know any possible suspect's 
3 name if you could learn it? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q You didn't have any other facts about 
6 the robbery at that time? 
7 A No. 
8 I Q You weren't going to be able to proceed 
9 investigating that, really, were you? 
10 A It all depended on what I found. 
11 Q Excuse me. 
12 A It all depended on what I found. 
13 Q What were you looking for that would have 
14 assisted you? 
15 A I don't know. Identification, initially. 
16 Q How would that have helped you? 
17 A To find out who he was. 
18 Q Now, knowing who he was, was there anything 
19 else further that you could do at that time to investigate 
20 the Postal Shop robbery? 
21 A As soon as I found out who he was, that 
22 was about it. 
23 Q Okay. 
24 A I wanted to find out who the car belonged 
25 to, also. 
21 
